

calling in all her ships. We were told that Norway had already lost 13 per cent of her total mercantile marine during the present War. The withdrawal of the Norwegian ships from the transport of Allied material would have been a serious blow, but the incident shows clearly the extent to which the fear of the submarine was intimidating even the bravest seafaring nations.

But during the first months of 1917, the Admiralty could not bring itself to change its tactics.

In January, 1917, Admiralty opinion was as emphatic as ever against convoys. An official pamphlet issued on behalf of the Admiralty in that month declared that:—

"Whenever possible, vessels should sail singly escorted as considered necessary. The system of several ships sailing together in a *convoy* is not recommended in any area of Admiralty . . . on convoys where submarine attack is a possibility.

It is evident that the larger the number of ships forming the convoy, the greater is the chance of a submarine being enabled to attack successfully, the greater is the difficulty of the escort in preventing such an attack. . . ."

The "Official History" states that this pamphlet accurately recorded the collective opinion of the Board of Admiralty, "for the minutes of those high officials who were more particularly

concerned with
the defence of trade are all expressive of
the same,
or nearly the same, view. The Director of
the Trade
Division, Sir Richard Webb, was against
convoys.
The Director of the Operations Division,
Sir Thomas
Jackson, was inconclusive. Admiral
Duff, the